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BAIL IN SOUTH CAROLINA-
THE BAIL ACT OF 1969t
WnILLIA Ff. LEDBETTER, JR.*
WEBSTER M yRS, JR.
* *
I. INTRODUCTION
Anglo-American criminal procedure typically calls for an
arrest at the outset of the prosecution. The assumption under-
lying arrest is that pretrial detention may be necessary to secure
the defendant's presence at trial, and if it is necessary to assure
his presence, it is authorized. A qualifying assumption, which
evolved early in the history of English criminal procedure and
which is one of the rallying points of freedom in western civili-
zation, is that the accused should not be detained prior to trial
if some other less oppressive means of securing his presence is
practicable.1 The practice of setting bail has emerged from this
latter assumption.
The chief component of the bail system has become "money
bail"--the method by which the defendant is released from pre-
trial custody only if he is able to post a specified amount of
currency or equivalent security, or can obtain a surety to pledge
the specified amount. Most observers acknowledge that money
bail works unfairly against the lower economic groups, and its
efficacy is doubted since the risk of financial loss on the accused
is certainly not the primary issue in determining risk of flight.
The shortcomings of the bail system are widely known and well
documented, and need not be repeated here.2
It is widely assumed that the only recognized valid purpose
for imposing bail as a condition to pretrial release is to insure
f This article is an excerpt from the forthcoming book, CaimiNAL DEFENSE
IN SOUTH CAROLINA, to be published by the South Carolina Bar Association.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina; B.A. cur
laude, Campbell College; LL.B., University of Richmond; LL.M. Yale Uni-
versity. Member of Virginia Bar and American Bar Association.
** Professor of Law, University of South Carolina; A.B., Marshall College;
LL.B., University of Virginia; Ford Fellow, LL.M., Columbia University;
Associate Professor of Law, Franklin University, 1959-62. Admitted to Bar:
West Virginia, 1958; Ohio, 1961; Member of the South Carolina Bar and
American Bar Association.
1. AMSTERDAM, SEGAL & MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF
CRIMINAL CASES § 55 (1967).
2. See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT'S CoaimISSIoN ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION oF JUSTICE, TASK FoRcE RFoRr: THE CouRTS 37-41 (1967).
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appearance at trial. It is an historical and elementary tenet of
Anglo-American jurisprudence that a person should not be in-
carcerated until proven guilty, and it follows that a person
accused of crime should be released pending his trial if he can
provide some reasonable assurance that he will not flee the juris-
diction. Most judicial officers frequently go beyond this view
of the purpose of bail and set high bail, or deny it altogether,
to prevent the release of persons who are thought to be "dan-
gerous." It cannot be denied that society has a legitimate
interest in protection against dangerous incorrigibles who might
otherwise commit more crimes pending trial.3 However, judicial
officers seldom have sufficient data to effectively guide them in
the determination of "danger", and often refuse to admit that
the amount of bail reflects preventive detention.
Even more serious is the fact that some officials view bail in
another light: they see it as a means by which persons who have
"clearly" engaged in criminal conduct can receive punishment in
addition to that imposed upon conviction. This usage of bail is
obviously antithetical to its historical purpose, but it is adopted
too often by officials in this and other states.
The development of new methods of pretrial release has begun
in most American jurisdictions. The Vera Foundation's Man-
hattan Bail Project 4 successfully disproved some of the false
premises surrounding bail and provided the model for changes in
bail procedures in many communities. The National Conference
on Bail and Criminal Justice of 1964 made an in-depth study of
the problems in the bail system. The reports from these and
other studies of the bail system indicate the desirability of di-
vorcing pretrial release from monetary considerations whenever
possible, and various pretrial release experiments have shown
that this can be done successfully.5 Influenced by these experi-
mental projects, Congress took a new approach in the federal
3. For this reason the Bail Act of 1969 in South Carolina expressly per-
mits the factor of "unreasonable danger to the community" to be taken into
consideration in setting conditions of release S. C. CODE ANx. § 17-300 (Supp.
1969).
4. See Ares, Rankin, and Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim
Report on the Use of Pretrial Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 67 (1963).
5. In the early 1960's several experimental bail projects such as the Man-
hattan Bail Project were tried in which qualified defendants were released on
bond without surety or simply on a promise to return for trial. The programs
worked successfully in New York, Washington, D. C., DesMoines and nearly
one hundred other communities. It reduced detention by fifty percent or more,
but the default rate for no-bail releases regularly ran below that of the bail
bond defendants. Wald and Freed, The Bail Reform Act of 1966: A Practi-
tioner's Primer, 52 A.B.AJ. 940 (1966).
19701
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol22/iss2/2
SOUTH CARoLINA LAW REVMW
system with the Bail Reform Act of 1966.6 This legislation
stresses release without monetary ties. Several states have fol-
lowed suit with similar bail reform laws. In South Carolina, a
new and potentially far-reaching Bail Act7 became law June 18,
1969, and is now applicable to all non-capital bail determinations.
II. R rT To BAIL
The right to pretrial release on bail was explicitly protected
by the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 and the Bill of
Rights of 1688. The legacy of these safeguards is found in the
constitutions and statutes of every American jurisdiction.
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution con-
tains a provision against excessive bail, but no express right to
bail is provided. It has been argued that this clause assumes and
thus compels an underlying right to bail, but the case law on this
point is undeveloped. It has also been argued that the bail pro-
vision of the eighth amendment is applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
because bail is a "fundamental guarantee of individual liberty,"
but the Supreme Court has not so held.8
In South Carolina, article I, § 20 of the Constitution of 1895
guarantees to all persons the right to bail before conviction,
except in capital cases where the proof is evident or the presump-
tion great. This phraseology is commonly used in state constitu-
tions throughout the country and simply means that bail is a
matter of right in all cases except those in which the offense is
punishable by death, and in the latter, bail is a matter of right
unless the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt great.
The South Carolina court has long held that the granting of
bail in capital cases is to be exercised with discretion and should
be done with great reserve.9
Excessive bail is prohibited by article I, § 19 of the South
Carolina Constitution. Except in cases of extreme abuse, the
meaning of this prohibition is elusive. It has been said that bail
is excessive when it is set at an amount higher than that reason-
ably calculated to insure that the accused will appear, stand
trial, and submit to sentence if convicted.' 0 Bail must not be
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1966).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-300 to -300.9 (Supp. 1969).
8, For a good discussion on the constitutional aspects of bail see Foote, The
Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 959 (1965).
9. State v. Hill, 5 S.C. (3 Brev.) 89 (1812).
10. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
[Vol. 22
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more than the accused can reasonably be expected to give under
the circumstances. 1 If bail is set at a high amount without a
proper hearing so that the admitting officer cannot argue that
he had information which justified his position, the accused
should have an excellent argument that the bail is excessive and
should be reduced. Under the Federal Bail Reform Act the
accused has the right to know how the commissioner arrived at
his decision to set bail, and he may request and secure the com-
missioner's written reasons for insisting on bail.12 While the
South Carolina Bail Act does not contain such a provision, coun-
sel for the defense should always urge that the judicial officer
give reasons for his determinations at the bail hearing.
The excessive bail provisions found in most constitutions in
this country are receiving attention today from those who argue
that the ability of the accused to give bail should be a strong
factor in determining the amount of bail. While financial ability
is not the controlling circumstance, many courts have stated that
the ability of the accused to give bail is a factor to be considered
and that a reasonable bond for one man might be excessive for
another. The South Carolina Bail Act of 1969 provides that one
of the circumstances that should be considered in determining
the conditions for release is the financial ability of the accused.'
The Act also attempts to abolish the requirement of sureties in
most cases.14 (See Section IIJ).
On appeal, bail is a matter of right in those cases where the
defendant has been sentenced to ten years or less.15 When the
defendant has been convicted and sentenced to a term exceeding
ten years, or sentenced to death, bail on appeal is within the
discretion of the supreme court, which will consider the probabil-
ity of reversal, the nature of the crime, the possibility of escape,
and the character and standing of the accused.' 6
III. PnocEmmum FoR AnrMNrG To BAnt
A. Officers Who May Admit to Bail
Several officers are authorized to admit to bail in South Caro-
11. Carlisle v. Landon, 73 S.Ct 1179 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1953). But ef.
White v. United States, 330 F.2d. 811 (8th Cir. 1964) where the Court refused
to hold that bail, otherwise non-excessive, was excessive when imposed against
a person who could not meet that amount
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(d) (1966).
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3002 (Supp. 1969).
14. S.C. CODE AxN. § 17-300 (Supp. 1969).
15. S.C. CODE AxN. § 7-8 (1962).
16. S.C. CONST. art. V., § 4. See also State v. Whitener, 225 S.C. 244, 81
SE2d 785 (1954); Nichols v. Patterson, 202 S.C. 352, 25 S.E.2d 155 (1943).
1970]
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lina. Magistrates may grant bail to any person charged with an
offense the punishment of which is other than death or life im-
prisonment. 17 Clerks of court may admit to bail any persons
charged with a misdemeanor.18 County court judges may admit
to bail in those cases triable by them.19 Circuit court judges may
admit to bail in all cases and are the only officials, other than
justices of the supreme court, who can admit to bail in capital
cases. Police officers and sheriffs have no power to release per-
sons on bail, although such officers often do so, frequently with
the permission of the local magistrate.
Ordinarily the crime will have been committed within the
jurisdiction of the admitting officer, but if the arrest by warrant
is made in a county other than that in which the offense is
charged, an authorized officer at the place of arrest may 'set
bail.2 0
The magistrate is the judicial officer who most frequently sets
bail in this state. It is estimated that this official handles more
than ninety-five percent of all bail proceedings.
B. The Bail Proceeding
In some of the State's urban areas, magistrate-level officers
conduct "bail hearings" that are somewhat more elaborate than
the usual bail proceedings in other areas of this State. In these
areas the judge's chambers or the courtroom is set aside to admit
to bail those persons taken into custody since the previous bail
hearing. Inquiry is made into the character and criminal record
of the accused, and the accused or his attorney is given the
privilege of arguing in mitigation of the conditions of release.
In most instances the bail proceeding is nothing so formal or
deliberative as that described in the preceding paragraph. More
often, the magistrate has the accused brought before him, listens
to the charge, and mechanically applies an amount established
by a rate schedule to the case. In many instances the defendant
is not taken before the magistrate; instead, arrangements are
made by telephone whereby the magistrate simply applies his
rate schedule to the case without inquiry into the risk of flight.
"Jailhouse bail" is common in South Carolina although it is
unauthorized. Where this type procedure is found the defendant
17. S.C. CODE ANx. §§ 43-241, -242 (1962).
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-301 (1962).
19. See the various county court acts in Title 15 of the Code of Laws of
South Carolina, 1962.
20. State v. Rabens, 79 S.C. 542, 60 S.E. 442 (1908).
Vol. 22
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is released by law enforcement officers or by the jailer without
any semblance of a hearing on the key issues of bail.
Whether these practices will be altered by the Bail Act of
1969 remains to be seen. The Act provides that in determining
which conditions of release to impose, the admitting officer may
take into account the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged, family ties of the accused, employment, financial re-
sources, character, mental condition, the length of his residence
in the community, his record of conviction, and any record of
flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at other court
proceedings.2 1 Although this act does not require the magistrate
or other judicial officer to conduct a bail hearing before im-
posing conditions and setting the amount,2 2 it is generally ac-
cepted that if bail is a matter of right the accused is entitled to
a hearing on his application for release. 23 Counsel should request
a bail hearing and a thorough consideration of the factors
enumerated above, and at such proceeding he should emphasize
those issues most favorable to the immediate release of the
accused at the lowest acceptable amount.
C. Forns of ConditionaZ Release
Pursuant to the Bail Act of 1969, section 17-300 provides that
any person charged with a non-capital offense must be released
pending trial on his own recognizance without surety, unless the
officer determines that such release (1) would not reasonably
assure the appearance of the accused as required, or (2) would
result in an unreasonable danger to the community. (This latter
consideration was not included in the Federal Bail Reform Act
of 1966; that Act has been criticized for this omission.24)
It is thought by some that this provision was intended to
create in South Carolina a form of "release on own recognizance"
(R.O.R.) that has been adopted in some other states and in the
federal system so that if the accused does not fall within the two
exceptions, he need only sign a written promise to attend all pro-
ceedings in the case and to remain on good behavior. With such
a construction of the word "recognizance", this state would be
adopting the position advocated by bail reformers by severing
21. S.C. CODE ANNr. § 17-300.2 (Supp. 1969).
22. The language of § 17-300.2 provides only that the officer "may" take
these factors into consideration "on the basis of available information."
23. See, e.g., Heikkinen v. United States, 208 F.2d 738 (7th Cir. 1953).
24. Wald and Freed, The Bail Reform Act of 1966: A Practitioner's Primer,
52 A.B.A.J. 940 (1966).
1970]
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the issue of pretrial release from the financial state of the de-
fendant
On the other hand, it has been contended that the word "re-
cognizance" as used in the Act should be construed to mean what
it has meant in this state for generations-a bond signed by the
accused in a specified amount, although without sureties because
of the new provision. Such an interpretation of the term is con-
sistent with its usage in an early form book25 and in Chapter 5
of Title 17 in the South Carolina Code26 on bail and recogni-
zances, and conforms to the definition given it in many other
jurisdictions. The Attorney General has adopted this interpreta-
tion of recognizance in preparing order forms for admitting
officers pursuant to section 17-300.3.
Thus, at present, if a non-capital defendant does not fall
within one of the two exceptions, he must be released if he signs
an unsecured bond (i.e., recognizance) in the amount specified
by the admitting officer. No matter what amount the officer
sets, the accused does not have to be actually "worth" that
amount in cash or property ownership in order to obtain his
release on the recognizance. The amount specified in the re-
cognizance is only an acknowledgement of an indebtedness to
the state in the amount specified, which becomes absolute should
the accused fail to comply with the conditions set forth.
Unless the admitting officer makes a determination that the
defendant falls within one of the two exceptions, no conditions
may be imposed on his release except that he should personally
appear at subsequent proceedings in the case, should remain on
good behavior, and should not depart the state. If the officer
attempts to set other conditions, counsel should insist that he
give his reasons for his finding that the defendant's release on
his own recognizance would not reasonably assure his presence
at the proceedings or would result in an unreasonable danger
to the community. If no hearing is conducted, as is too fre-
quently the case in many localities, obviously no rational deter-
mination of these matters can be made. If the defendant is a
resident of the community and is charged with a minor offense,
the officer would find it difficult to make a valid determination
that the defendant falls within one of the two exceptions. So,
although the Bail Act does not explicitly require a hearing, the
25. EA-LES, SOUTH CAROLINA Foi Boox 401 (1911).
26. S.C. CODn AxN. § 17-301 to -316 (1962).
[Vol. 22
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fact that it requires various determinations necessarily assumes,
and in fact compels, that an adequate bail hearing be conducted.
If the admitting officer in a non-capital case determines that
the defendant's release on his own recognizance would not rea-
sonabily assure his appearance as required, or would result in
unreasonable danger to the community, the defendant still has
his constitutional right to bail, but the officer may impose any
one or more of the conditions set forth in section 17-300: (a) re-
quire the execution of a bond with good and sufficient sureties;
(b) place the person in the custody of a designated person or or-
ganization agreeing to supervise him; (c) place restrictions on
the travel, association, or place of abode of the person during the
period of release; and (d) impose any other condition deemed
reasonably necessary to assure appearance, including a condition
that the person return to custody after specified hours.27 The
purpose of this provision is to provide some leeway in selecting
the methods by which the defendant's appearance at trial may
be assured. Although there is no guarantee that magistrates will
not routinely require a surety bond in every case where a risk
of flight is found to exist, counsel should try to prevent this
result with arguments that other conditions would suffice.
Particularly if the defendant has strong roots in the community
and a stable employment and family situation, one of the other
forms of release should be used.
If the officer insists on a secured bond, some means of security
other than a commercial surety should be used, if possible. For
example, the defendant may have friends or relatives who will
act as sureties without fee. It is unlawful for the attorney him-
self to be taken as bail 28 although this prohibition is frequently
circumvented. The defendant may be permitted to deposit cash
or negotiable securities--such as a check 29-equal to the amount
of the bond. Although there is no statute authorizing the deposit
of a real property interest as security for a bail bond, there is no
reason why such could not be permitted. If a deposit is made in
a case triable in a magistrate's court, it cannot exceed the maxi-
mum fine for the offense for which the person is to be tried.8 0
The deposit of cash or other security, or the services of a
friend or relative to act as surety, is least costly to the defendant
since the premium paid to a commercial bondsman (at about ten
27. S.C. CODE-A N. § 17-300 (Supp. 1969).
28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-305 (1962).
129. State v. Harrelson, 211 S.C. 11, 43 S.E2d 593 (1947).
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-243 (1962).
19701
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percent of the face amount of the bond) is not recoverable even
if the defendant complies with all the conditions set forth
therein.
The Bail Act does not provide for the depositing of securities
in lieu of surety as a condition of release, but since this new
legislation does not repeal the statutes that permit some of these
substitute methods and does not expressly prohibit the methods
that are in common usage, it seems that such a deposit may still
be made.
In some cases no form of release will be available to the
accused except with commercial surety. Professional bondsmen
are available in most metropolitan areas in the state, and in
other communities there are prominent citizens who provide this
service for a fee.
Since the Bail Act does not apply to capital cases, the condi-
tions of release enumerated in section 17-300 are not available to
capital offenders; only the forms of release provided in Chapter
5 of Title 17 in the South Carolina Code prior to the 1969
amendments are applicable to such cases. As a practical matter,
bond with surety is almost always required.
The defendant in a capital case may be denied bail if the
proof of his guilt is evident or the presumption great,31 and
since bail can be set in such cases only by the circuit court judge
or a justice of the supreme court, a bail hearing of some sort is
ordinarily conducted to determine these issues and to decide in
what amount the bond should be set.
D. Posting Bail
Unless the magistrate determines that a release on recogni-
zance will not reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant
or will result in an unreasonable danger to the community, the
defendant must be released on his own recognizance without
surety.32 In such cases, after the admitting officer sets the
amount of bail, the defendant "posts bail" by (1) signing the
appearance recognizance whereby he acknowledges an indebted-
ness to the state which may become absolute upon his failure to
comply with the conditions, and (2) acknowledges his under-
standing of the terms and conditions of his release on a form.
Where the admitting officer determines that the case is em-
braced within one of the two exceptions, but he is persuaded by
31. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 20.
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-300 (Supp. 1969).
[V ol. 2
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counsel to forego the surety requirement and impose one or more
of the conditions listed in paragraphs (b) through (d) of §
17-300, the defendant "posts bail" by signing the proper forms,
including an acknowledgement of his understanding of the terms
of the conditions of his release, supplied by the admitting
officer.
If the admitting officer determines that the case falls within
one of the two exceptions and insists upon security for the bond,
the defendant must obtain the wherewithal to make up the
amount, either by deposit or by surety (as discussed in sub-
section C, supra). If the officer accepts a deposit of cash or
securities, the defendant should obtain a receipt. If the de-
fendant is released on a surety bond, "posting bail" consists of
the defendant and his surety signing the bond (a form) and
obtaining a discharge order. Often the discharge order is a. tele-
phone call to the jailer informing him to release the defendant.
Where a professional surety is used, the surety usually takes
care of the release. It is preferable, however, for counsel to go
to the jail to see that the defendant is immediately released
from custody and to reiterate to him the conditions and terms
of his release.
IV. DuRATON oF BAIm
South Carolina practice is to set bail to assure the defendant's
appearance at trial, and for this reason new bail is not demanded
at other pretrial stages. This does not mean, however, that the
recognizance cannot be conditioned on appearance at pretrial
hearings. If it is so conditioned and the defendant is given
proper notice but fails to appear, the bond may be estreated at
that stage.83 Likewise, where the defendant is released on his
own recognizance pursuant to the Bail Act, the court could im-
pose additional or different conditions of release upon the de-
fendant's failure to comply with any of the original conditions
such as appearing at all of the pretrial proceedings.
34
If the case is not tried at the first term after the defendant is
released on bail, he is under an obligation to attend future terms
of court until there has been a final disposition of the case.
The fact that the defendant's attorney fails to notify him that
the case might come up at the next term does not relieve the de-
fendant or his surety of the obligation to appear.35 A final
33. State v. Williams, 84 S.C. 21, 65 S.E. 982 (1909).
34. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-300.4 (Supp. 1969).
35. State v. Johnson, 213 S.C. 241, 49 S.E.2d 6 (1948).
19701
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disposition is not rendered until an order of discharge is issued
by the court at which the party is bound to appear, and thus a
finding of no bill by the grand jury or a noZle prosegui by the
solicitor does not discharge the obligation.36
A bond on appeal requires the defendant to appear in the
trial court after the verdict has been reversed and the case re-
manded for a new trial.87
V. REMEDIS
In some states, review of an adverse bail determination is
available by appeal, but South Carolina has no provision per-
mitting appeal from a denial of bail or the setting of excessive
bail.
In those states that do not provide appellate review of bail
issues, a writ of habeas corpus is allowed. Although there are
no cases on point, South Carolina has recognized that habeas
corpus is available for the purpose of inquiring into the deten-
tion of a person and whether he is entitled to an absolute or con-
ditional discharge.88
A writ of mandamus may issue where an official refuses to
perform a ministerial function. Since a bail hearing is needed in
capital cases to determine whether the proof is evident or the
presumption great and is necessary in non-capital cases in order
to make the determinations required by the Bail Act of 1969, it
can be argued that a denial of bail without even a hearing can be
remedied by writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus may issue
from the circuit court89 or from the supreme court.40 But if the
officer conducts a hearing and then decides not to grant bail, or
decides to set bail in an allegedly excessive amount, mandamus
will not lie since the issue in such a case is not whether the
officer failed to perform a ministerial act but rather whether he
abused his discretionary powers.
When state courts refuse bail, some possible avenues can be
pursued in the federal courts. A state court defendant might be
able to obtain a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court
36. State v. Williams, 84 S.C. 21, 65 S.E. 982 (1909); Whaley v. Lawton,
57 S.C. 256, 35 S.E. 558 (1900).
37. Mayesville v. McCutchen, 205 S.C. 241, 31 S.E.2d 390 (1944).
38. State v. Farris, 51 S.C. 176, 28 S.E. 308 (1897). See also 39 C.J.S.
Habeas Corpus § 34 (1944). For the procedure of filing for a writ of habeas
corpus in South Carolina, see S.C. CODE A~x. § 17-351 et. seq. (1962).
39. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 15.
40. S.C. CoNsT. art. V, § 4.
[Vrol. 229
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on the theory that he has a substantial federal claim because of
the deprivation of his federal constitutional right to bail pend-
ing trial. Although many authorities expect that the United
States Supreme Court will soon apply the eighth amendment's
prohibition against excessive bail to the states, and might even
announce that denial of bail in some cases violates due process,
there are no decisions to this effect at the moment. The exhaus-
tion+l doctrine, which provides that state remedies must be
exhausted before a federal writ can be obtained, is not applicable
if the state courts have made a final, non-appealable ruling on
the issue. Where the circumstances are such that obtaining an
express denial of bail is difficult, the defendant may be able to
file the federal habeas corpus petition without exhausting state
remedies on the theory that the state has failed to provide ade-
quate remedies.42
The defendant may file a petition for a writ of certiorari from
the state court's adverse decision, treating the denial of bail or
the excessive bail as a final state judgment for the purpose 28
United States Code § 1257 where no state appellate process is
available. Obviously there would be a lengthy waiting period
before the United States Supreme Court acted.
VI. DEFAULT
If the defendant defaults on his bond or otherwise violates
the terms of his release, the bond may be forfeited by a rule to
show cause why the instrument should not be estreated.43 The
show cause procedure seems to be the statutory replacement of
the old common law writ of scire faoias.44 The proceeding to
estreat the bond is instituted in the circuit court by the so-
licitor.
45
Complex contractual rights and obligations are created by the
bail bond, especially if a surety is involved. Suffice it to say
that the instrument evidences an obligation of record which be-
comes absolute if the defendant fails to comply with the condi-
tions set forth therein. The state must show that the condition
was violated, but such a showing may be made by use of extrinsic
41. 28 U.S.C. § 22,54.
42. See, e.g., In re Shuttleworth, 369 U.S. 35 (1962).
43. S.C.CODE ANN. § 17-311 (1962).
44. See State v. Wilder, 13 S.C. 344 (1880), where the writ of scire facias
was used.
45. State v. Bailey, 248 S.C. 438, 151 S.E.2d 87 (1966).
1970]
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evidence. 46 For instance if the condition of the bond was that
the defendant appear at trial, the solicitor must show that he
was given proper notice, that he was regularly called, and that
he failed to appear.
Because a contractual relation is involved, estreat is subject
to estoppel. Thus, in State V. SiMqing4-7 the state was estopped
because it had waived its right to require the appearance of the
defendant when the prosecution permitted the defendant's at-
torney to appear without the defendant and to consent to a
verdict of guilty.
If the defendant fails to appear at the time scheduled for the
proceeding in his case, he is not relieved of liability by a belated
appearance after he is subsequently apprehended.48
In addition to forfeiture, the defendant may be subject to
prosecution for a separate and distinct offense if he willfully
fails to appear.49
46. State v. Comell, 70 S.C. 409, 50 S.E. 22 (1905).
47. 230 S.C. 49, 94 S.E.2d 9 (1956).
48. State v. Bailey, 248 S.C. 438, 151 S.E.2d 87 (1966).
49. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-300.8 (Supp. 1969).
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